A Competitive Distribution of Auctions

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A Competitive Distribution of Auctions

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Michael Peters

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Michael Peters

Abstract

In this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers, all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded. A competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism. It is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller's best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market.

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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number peters-95-03.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 08 Aug 1995
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Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-95-03

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Article
- Peters, Michael, 1997. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Steven A. Matthews, 1983. "On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions," Discussion Papers 560, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matthews, Steven A, 1984. "On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1519-22, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1991. "The Double Auction Market: Institutions," Discussion Papers 971, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Manelli, Alejandro M & Vincent, Daniel R, 1995. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 591-620, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

James Peck, 1995. "Competition in Transactions Mechanisms: The Emergence of Price Competition," Working Papers 022, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Peck, James, 1996. "Competition in Transactions Mechanisms: The Emergence of Price Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 109-123, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Michael Peters, 1998. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers peters-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Peters, Michael, 2000. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 139-168, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," GE, Growth, Math methods 9507001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," Working Papers peters-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Peters, Michael, 1997. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(2), pages 241-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John Kennes, 2004. "Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application," Discussion Papers 04-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- John Kennes, 2004. "Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application," CAM Working Papers 2004-17, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. [Downloadable!]
Roberto Burguet, 2000. "Auction theory: a guided tour," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 3-50, January. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Burguet, R., 1998. "Auction Theory: a Guided Tour," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 422.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Michael Peters, 1997. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers peters-97-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Peters, Michael, 2001. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(3), pages 613-31, July.
Marcel Jansen, 2003. "Can Job Competition Prevent Hold-Ups?," Economics Working Papers we035120, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jansen, Marcel, 2004. "Can Job Competition Prevent Hold-Ups?," IZA Discussion Papers 988, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Michelacci, Claudio & Suarez, Javier, 2002. "Incomplete Wage Posting," CEPR Discussion Papers 3658, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Claudio Michelacci & Javier Suarez, 2006. "Incomplete Wage Posting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1098-1123, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2001. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Working Papers peters-01-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Internet auctions with many traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 220-245, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2008. "Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
Harry J. Paarsch & Bjarne Brentstrup, 2004. "Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 36, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Harry J. Paarsch & Bjarne Brendstrup, 2004. "Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 149, Econometric Society.
- Harry J. Paarsch & Bjarne Brendstrup, 2004. "Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 2, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- Harry J. Paarsch & Bjarne Brendstrup, 2004. "Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders," Working Papers 2004.11, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
Michael Peters, 1996. "Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment," Working Papers peters-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michael Peters, 1999. "Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 273-292. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Burguet, 2004. "Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More Simple Economics," Working Papers 2004.144, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
repec:att:wimass:1920111 is not listed on IDEAS
Moen, Espen R & Riis, Christian, 2005. "Efficient Exclusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 5257, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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