Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment
AbstractA competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have private information about their own private use value for the commodity being traded. In addition the commodity has a common value to all buyers, perhaps represented by the future resale value of the commodity. A competitive equilibrium in mechanisms is described. In every such equilibrium it is shown that sellers must offer mechanisms that are allocationally equivalent to English ascending price auctions. The reservation prices that sellers set are shown to be below their ex post cost of trading the commodity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 24 April 1998 / Accepted: 8 March 1999
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Michael Peters, 1996. "Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment," Working Papers peters-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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