Global Democracy: In the Beginning
AbstractTalk about global democracy seems to be fixated on a Reform-Act model of democracy, with 'one person one vote for all affected by the decisions' as for example in a second popularly-apportioned chamber of UN. Politically, that seems wildly unrealistic. But remember that the Reform Acts came very late in process of democratization domestically. The first steps in the beginning that eventually led to full democratization of that sort were: a) limiting the arbitrary rule on the part of the sovereign; and (b) making the sovereign accountable to others (initially a limited set of others, which then expanded). Globally, there are moves afoot globally in both those directions. And once those pieces are in place, there are good reasons for expecting the circle of accountability basically only to expand and virtually never to contract.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 30.
Date of creation: May 2008
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global democracy; accountability; rule of law;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- F55 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-01-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2009-01-17 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-01-17 (Positive Political Economics)
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