The Viability of Economic Reform Programs Supported by the International Financial Institutions
AbstractIn seeking to make programs of economic reform supported by the IFIs more successful it is important to ensure that they are viable. Will governments be persuaded to participate? Will they complete the programs they negotiate? And will the IFIs be prepared to provide the resources? This paper formally analyses the factors influencing viability. It examines the constraints on participation and the need for incentive compatibility. The analysis identifies the threats to viability and the direction that reform should take. It places the effectiveness of programs firmly within a political economy framework and extends recent theories of program implementation by examining participation from the viewpoint of both the governments that demand assistance and the IFIs that supply it.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of Surrey in its series School of Economics Discussion Papers with number 0605.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F0 - International Economics - - General
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-24 (All new papers)
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