Slightly Altruistic Equilibria in Normal Form Games
AbstractWe introduce a refinement concept for Nash equilibria (slightly altruistic equilibrium) defined by a limit process and which captures the idea of reciprocal altruism as presented in Binmore (2003). Existence is guaranteed for every finite game and for a large class of games with a continuum of strategies. Results and examples emphasize the (lack of) connections with classical refinement concepts. Finally, it is shown that under a pseudo-monotonicity assumption on a particular operator associated to the game it is possible, by selecting slightly altruistic equilibria, to eliminate those equilibria in which a player can switch to a strategy that is better for the others without leaving the set of equilibria.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 185.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2007
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-10-27 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-27 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998.
"A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,"
1998-37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5899, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Margin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000090, David K. Levine.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
- Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001.
"A Theory of Reciprocity,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- David K Levine, 1997.
"Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2047, David K. Levine.
- Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001.
"Preference Evolution and Reciprocity,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1997. "Rationality and Bounded Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 2-14, October.
- Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1995. "Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1421-43, November.
- Hillas, John & Jansen, Mathijs & Potters, Jos & Vermeulen, Dries, 2001. "On the relation among some definitions of strategic stability," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-3970, Maastricht University.
- Ritzberger, Klaus, 1994. "The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 207-36.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
- Giuseppe De Marco & Jacqueline Morgan, 2008. "Friendliness And Reciprocity In Equilibrium Selection," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(01), pages 53-72.
- Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596 Elsevier.
- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
445, David K. Levine.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.