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ECB Decision-making and the Status of the Eurogroup in an Enlarged EMU

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  • Wojciech Paczynski

Abstract

This paper analyses the link between forthcoming EU enlargement and selected aspects of EU institutional reforms, namely decision making rules in the European Central Bank and the status of the Eurogroup. It argues that some earlier arguments calling for urgent ECB reform are based on unrealistic assumptions. It concludes that the reform recently adopted by the EU Council as well as the present system, while not free from shortcomings, could provide a workable environment for monetary policy in an enlarged EMU. Additionally, the paper claims that designing efficient institutional solutions for the EU Council is also important from the perspective of new member states as it might impact on their chances for early adoption of the common currency.

Suggested Citation

  • Wojciech Paczynski, 2003. "ECB Decision-making and the Status of the Eurogroup in an Enlarged EMU," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0262, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0262
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    File URL: https://case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/1582694_262.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barry Eichengreen, 2004. "Institutions for Fiscal Stability," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(1), pages 1-25.
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    3. Yunus Aksoy & Paul De Grauwe & Hans Dewachter, 2014. "Do Asymmetries Matter for European Monetary Policy?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Exchange Rates and Global Financial Policies, chapter 13, pages 321-353, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Barry Eichengreen & Fabio Ghironi, 2002. "EMU and Enlargement," Chapters, in: Marco Buti & André Sapir (ed.), EMU and Economic Policy in Europe, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. repec:oup:ecpoli:v:18:y:2003:i:37:p:357-394 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Lommatzsch, Kirsten & Tober, Silke, 2002. "Monetary policy aspects of the enlargement of the Euro area," Research Notes 4, Deutsche Bank Research.
    7. Ellen E. Meade & Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Jacek Rostowski, 2003. "When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0253, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    9. Daniel Gros, 2003. "An opportunity missed!," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 38(3), pages 124-129, May.
    10. Myerson, Roger B., 2013. "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(3), pages 305-337, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marek Dabrowski, 2006. "A Strategy for EMU Enlargement," Springer Books, in: Marek Dabrowski & Jacek Rostowski (ed.), The Eastern Enlargement of the Eurozone, chapter 0, pages 199-225, Springer.

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