Rent-Seeking and Gender in Local Governance
AbstractThe paper examines the relationship between corruption and gender in institutions of local government in India, using a Logit model. Recent debates about women’s participation in electoral politics suggest that the presence of more women in government will engender public policy, and also tends to reduce corruption. The evidence we examined indicates that gender is not a significant factor in explaining levels of corruption. Although nearly 40 per cent of the elective positions in the institutions of local government are occupied by women there is no significant gender difference in the attitudes towards rent-seeking and in the actual levels of corruption.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore in its series Working Papers with number 164.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Local Governance; Corruption; Gender;
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