Using a two period model with moral hazard and uninsured risk, we argue that the decline in equity premium from its historically high level is due to a gradual elimination of barriers to universal banking. The loan contracts set up by financial intermediaries became more complete in nature with the advent of universal banking in the 90s following the Gramm-Leach-Billy Act. Hence, it is the nature of the loan contracts, not just the borrowing constraint and uninsured risks that is more fundamental in explaining the size of the equity premium.
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Paper provided by Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis in its series CDMA Conference Paper Series with number
0502.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ravi Jagannathan & Ellen R. McGrattan & Anna Scherbina., 2000.
"The declining U.S. equity premium,"
Quarterly Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-19.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Mehra, Rajnish & Prescott, Edward C., 2003.
"The equity premium in retrospect,"
Handbook of the Economics of Finance,
in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 889-938
Elsevier.
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