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Patent Protection with a Cooperative R&D Option

Author

Listed:
  • Che, XiaoGang

    (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)

  • Yang, Yibai

    (University of Sydney)

Abstract

Patent protection may decrease R&D incentives due to the tournament e ffect. In this paper, we show that patent protection in the presence of a cooperative R&D option always increases the R&D incentive. In addition, this option dominates imitation to increase the R&D incentive under patent protection, and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on the R&D cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Che, XiaoGang & Yang, Yibai, 2012. "Patent Protection with a Cooperative R&D Option," Working Papers 2012-6, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:albaec:2012_006
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2005. "Patents and R & D: The tournament effect," Discussion Papers 05-05, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    2. Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1307-1320, December.
    3. Rockett, Katharine, 1990. "The quality of licensed technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 559-574, December.
    4. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2006. "Patents and R&D with imitation and licensing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 196-201, November.
    5. Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2005. "Patents and R&D: The tournament effect," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 120-126, October.
    6. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July.
    7. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-1306, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Karbowski Adam & Prokop Jacek, 2020. "The Impact of Patents and R&D Cooperation on R&D Investments in a Differentiated Goods Industry," South East European Journal of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 15(1), pages 122-133, June.
    2. Yang, Yibai, 2013. "Optimal patent policy, research joint ventures, and growth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 381-384.
    3. Adam Karbowski, 2020. "A Note on Patents and Leniency," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1, pages 97-108.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperative R&D; patent protection; R&D incentive;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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