Relational goods, private consumption and social poverty traps in an evolutionary game
AbstractWe investigate how the patterns of consumption and accumulation, as well as the patterns of time allocation and of social interaction, may be influenced by social pressure, i.e., by the choices of others. We display an evolutionary model involving several generations of interacting individuals,in which different patterns may coexist in equilibrium and in which path dependence and critical mass effects play an important role. Bomze's (1983) classification is used to study the properties of this game. We find that social pressure may lead to low welfare traps' with overwork and overconsumption, and that policy may have a role as a coordination device
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit in its series AICCON Working Papers with number 25-2005.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 13 Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Social interaction; Relational goods; Coordination failure;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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