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Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment:Public versus Private Provision

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Author Info
Tim Worall
Jonathan P Thomas

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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2005 Meeting Papers with number 158.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed005:158

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Related research
Keywords: Social Insurance; Moral Hazard; Limited Commitment; Unemployment Insurance; Crowding Out.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Anderberg, Dan & Andersson, Fredrik, 2000. "Social Insurance with Risk-Reducing Investments," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(265), pages 37-56, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri, 1999. "Risk sharing: private insurance markets or redistributive taxes?," Staff Report 262, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2002. "Informal Family Insurance And The Design Of The Welfare State," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 481-503, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2000. "Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 216-246, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Atkeson, Andrew & Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 427-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hanno Lustig, 2001. "The Market Price of Aggregate Risk and the Wealth Distribution," Finance 0111004, EconWPA, revised 16 Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Attanasio, Orazio & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 2000. "Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public insurance reduce welfare?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1225-1258, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-90, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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