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Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance

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Author Info
Whinston, Michael D.
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-45912F7-8S/2/ed21ca0f39075e9dd1fc888876b6e49f
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 22 (1983)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 49-71
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:22:y:1983:i:1:p:49-71

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2008. "A Continuous Model of Income Insurance," Working Paper Series 763, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2008. "A Continuous Model of Income Insurance," Seminar Papers 756, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public vs Private Provision," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/20, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2006. "A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms," Working Paper Series 659, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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