Public Insurance against Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Risk: The Case of Social Security and Progressive Income Taxation
AbstractIn this article, I discuss the role a progressive income tax system and a redistributive pay as you go (PAYGO) social security system can play in insuring and reallocating idiosyncratic as well as aggregate risk. I also argue that the underlying source of market failures generating such a role for government intervention may be crucial when determining the normative consequences of such social insurance. (JEL Classifications: E62, H21, H24, H55). Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by CESifo in its journal CESifo Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 52 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
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