A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights
AbstractWhy do democratic societies often impose legal restrictions that render various assets or entitlements inalienable, thereby limiting the disposable property rights of individuals? The explanation proposed here is that these constraints arise as an institutional response against private debt markets that, in a sense, work `too well'. That is, I demonstrate how a well-functioning financial market can potentially work against a social policy designed to ensure a basic minimum standard of living for all types of individuals. Inalienable property rights and debt constraints emerge as a natural institutional response to the relatively improvident tendencies of some members of society when a majority of individuals share a common distaste for neighborhood squalor. Pourquoi les sociétés démocratiques imposent-elles souvent des restrictions légales limitant les droits ou actifs transférables des individus? L'explication proposée ici est que ces contraintes apparaissent comme une réponse institutionnelle contre des marchés privés des dettes qui, dans un certain sens, fonctionnent `trop bien'. En effet, je démontre comment un marché financier fonctionnant bien peut aller à l'encontre d'une politique sociale sensée assurer un niveau de vie de base minimum pour toutes les catégories d'individus. Des droits de propriété inaliénables et des contraintes sur les dettes émergent comme des réponses institutionnelles naturelles au manque de prévoyance de certains membres de la société lorsqu'une majorité des individus partage un dégoût commun pour la misère avoisinante.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal in its series Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers with number 110.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station, Montreal (Canada) Quebec, H3C 3P8
Phone: (514) 987-6181
Fax: (514) 987-8494
Web page: http://ideas.uqam.ca/CREFE/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2000-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2000-04-17 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-FMK-2000-04-17 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-IND-2000-04-17 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2000-04-17 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine, 1993.
"Debt Constrained Asset Markets,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1276, David K. Levine.
- Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991.
"A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,"
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
/1991/233, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 841-79, November.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1995. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," Working papers 592, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- George J. Stigler, 1967. "Imperfections in the Capital Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 287.
- Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-66, November.
- Lawrance, Emily C, 1991. "Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 54-77, February.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
- Fay, S. & Hurst, E. & White, M.J., 1998. "The Bankruptcy Decision: Does Stigma Matter?," Papers 98-01, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1999. " Systems of Benevolent Utility Functions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 71-100.
- World Bank, 2007. "India - Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Other Operational Studies 7818, The World Bank.
- Stark, Oded & Sorger, Gerhard, 2012.
"Income redistribution going awry: The reversal power of the concern for relative deprivation,"
University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance
47, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
- Sorger, Gerhard & Stark, Oded, 2013. "Income redistribution going awry: The reversal power of the concern for relative deprivation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 1-9.
- Sorger, Gerhard & Stark, Oded, 2012. "Income redistribution going awry: The reversal power of the concern for relative deprivation," Discussion Papers 142407, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
- J. Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2013. "Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence from cross-border transfers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 279-301, August.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2005.
"Bankruptcy Law, Bonded Labor and Inequality,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series
DP-155, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Bankruptcy Law, Bonded Labor And Inequality," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-035, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf, 2006. "Bankruptcy law, bonded labor and inequality," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2006 18, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Stark, Oded, 2005.
"Inequality and Migration: A Behavioral Link,"
178, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series 2695, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jeremy Lise, 2006.
"On-the-Job Search and Precautionary Savings: Theory and Empirics of Earnings and Wealth Inequality,"
2006 Meeting Papers
137, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jeremy Lise, 2011. "On-the-Job Search and Precautionary Savings: Theory and Empirics of Earnings and Wealth Inequality," IFS Working Papers W11/16, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Deininger, Klaus, 2010. "Towards sustainable systems of land administration: Recent evidence and challenges for Africa," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, African Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 5(1), September.
- Kartik B. Athreya & Xuan S. Tam & Eric R. Young, 2011. "Loan guarantees for consumer credit markets," Working Paper 11-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- World Bank, 2007. "India : Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15791, March.
- Stark, Oded, 2013.
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-9.
- Stark, Oded, 2013. "Stressful integration," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 56, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
- Stark, Oded, 2013. "Stressful Integration," Discussion Papers 150233, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2006.
"Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Hierarchies and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-034, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2005.
- Kartik B. Athreya & Xuan S. Tam & Eric R. Young, 2009. "Are harsh penalties for default really better?," Working Paper 09-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stéphane Pallage).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.