This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
David Andolfatto () (University of Waterloo and CREFE)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Why do democratic societies often impose legal restrictions that render various assets or entitlements inalienable, thereby limiting the disposable property rights of individuals? The explanation proposed here is that these constraints arise as an institutional response against private debt markets that, in a sense, work `too well'. That is, I demonstrate how a well-functioning financial market can potentially work against a social policy designed to ensure a basic minimum standard of living for all types of individuals. Inalienable property rights and debt constraints emerge as a natural institutional response to the relatively improvident tendencies of some members of society when a majority of individuals share a common distaste for neighborhood squalor.

Pourquoi les sociétés démocratiques imposent-elles souvent des restrictions légales limitant les droits ou actifs transférables des individus? L'explication proposée ici est que ces contraintes apparaissent comme une réponse institutionnelle contre des marchés privés des dettes qui, dans un certain sens, fonctionnent `trop bien'. En effet, je démontre comment un marché financier fonctionnant bien peut aller à l'encontre d'une politique sociale sensée assurer un niveau de vie de base minimum pour toutes les catégories d'individus. Des droits de propriété inaliénables et des contraintes sur les dettes émergent comme des réponses institutionnelles naturelles au manque de prévoyance de certains membres de la société lorsqu'une majorité des individus partage un dégoût commun pour la misère avoisinante.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/CREFE/cahiers/cah110.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Main text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal in its series Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers with number 110.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:110

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station, Montreal (Canada) Quebec, H3C 3P8
Phone: (514) 987-6181
Fax: (514) 987-8494
Email:
Web page: http://ideas.uqam.ca/CREFE/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Stéphane Pallage).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lawrance, Emily C, 1991. "Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 54-77, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1999. " Systems of Benevolent Utility Functions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 71-100. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 841-79, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Fay, S. & Hurst, E. & White, M.J., 1998. "The Bankruptcy Decision: Does Stigma Matter?," Papers 98-01, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  5. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. George J. Stigler, 1967. "Imperfections in the Capital Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 287. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-66, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dilip Mookherjee & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2005. "Bankruptcy Law, Bonded Labor and Inequality," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series DP-155, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stark, Oded, 2005. "Inequality and Migration: A Behavioral Link," Economics Series 178, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Hierarchies and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-034, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Kartik B. Athreya & Xuan S. Tam & Eric R. Young, 2009. "Are harsh penalties for default really better?," Working Paper 09-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.