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Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers

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Author Info
Robert Gibbons
Kevin Murphy

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/248.pdf
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Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 628.

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Date of creation: Jan 1989
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Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:628

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Related research
Keywords: agency theory relative performance evaluation executive compensation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
G19 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Other

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    Other versions:
  4. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dye, Ronald A, 1984. "The Trouble with Tournaments," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 147-49, January.
  6. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-72, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-54, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Coughlan, Anne T. & Schmidt, Ronald M., 1985. "Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 43-66, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2004. "Common Shocks and Relative Compensation Schemes," IEPR Working Papers 05.21, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
  2. Egon Franck & Torsten Pudack & Christian Opitz, 2001. "Zur Funktion von Topmanagement-Beratungen als Karrieresprungsbrett für High Potentials," Working Papers 0003, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU). [Downloadable!]
  3. Marco Celentani & Rosa Loveira-Pazó, 2004. "What Form of Relative Performance Evaluation?," Economics Working Papers 744, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, 2005. "Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0503, Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Gerald Marschke & Pascal Courty, . "The Challenge of Measuring Productivity: A Case Study of Performance Measurement in a Job Training Program," Discussion Papers 02-08, State University of New York at Albany, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Potters, J.J.M. & Rockenbach, B. & Sadrieh, A. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 2003. "Collusion under yardstick competition an experimental study," Discussion Paper 97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Roger H. Gordon, 1990. "Do Publicly Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?," NBER Working Papers 3303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Felipe Balmaceda, . "Compensation Methods in Competitive Labor Markert," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv118, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  9. Leslie Eldenburg & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach & Marta Wosinska, 2001. "Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form," NBER Working Papers 8201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, 1999. "Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering," NBER Working Papers 7124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Felipe Balmaceda, 2002. "Compensation Methods in a Competitive Labor Market: the Role of Asymmetric Information," Documentos de Trabajo 139, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  12. Rajesh Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1998. "The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2002. "Managing Option Fragility," NBER Working Papers 9059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Simon Grant & Stephen King & Ben Polak, 1995. "Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1107, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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