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Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Robert Gibbons
Kevin Murphy
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Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number
628.
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Date of creation: Jan 1989Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:628Contact details of provider: Postal: Firestone Library, Princeton, New Jersey 08544-2098 Phone: 609 258-4041 Fax: 609 258-2907 Web page: http://www.irs.princeton.edu/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: agency theory relative performance evaluation executive compensation Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation G19 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Other
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Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2004.
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Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, 2005.
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Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance
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Potters, J. & Rockenbach, B. & Sadrieh, A., 2003.
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"Compensation Methods in Competitive Labor Markert ,"
ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers
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Leslie Eldenburg & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach & Marta Wosinska, 2001.
"Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form ,"
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John M. Abowd & David S. Kaplan, 1999.
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Other versions: Felipe Balmaceda, 2002.
"Compensation Methods in a Competitive Labor Market: the Role of Asymmetric Information ,"
Documentos de Trabajo
139, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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Rajesh Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1998.
"The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation ,"
NBER Working Papers
6634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Other versions: Brian J. Hall & Thomas A. Knox, 2002.
"Managing Option Fragility ,"
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Simon Grant & Stephen King & Ben Polak, 1995.
"Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
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Grant, Simon & King, Stephen & Polak, Ben, 1996.
" Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour ,"
Journal of Economic Surveys ,
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