On Feelings as a Heuristic for Making Offers in Ultimatum Negotiations
AbstractThis research examines how the reliance on emotional feelings as a heuristic influences the proposal of offers in negotiations. Results from three experiments based on the classic ultimatum game show that, compared to proposers who do not rely on their feelings, proposers who rely on their feelings make less generous offers in the standard ultimatum game, more generous offers in a variant of the game allowing responders to make counteroffers, and less generous offers in the dictator game where no responses are allowed. Reliance on feelings triggers a more literal form of play, whereby proposers focus more on how they feel toward the offers themselves than on how they feel toward the possible outcomes of these offers, as if their offers were the final outcomes. Proposers relying on their feelings also tend to focus on gist-based, simpler construals of negotiations that capture only the essential aspects of the situation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8779.
Date of creation: 08 May 2008
Date of revision:
affect; emotions; heuristics; bargaining; ultimatum game; affect as information; affect heuristic; trust in feelings;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-05-24 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2008-05-24 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-05-24 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-05-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2008-05-24 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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