Currency board (CB) was a corner solution for Argentine hyperinflation, however its balance is controversial. How does a CB work as a long run regime? After evaluating the result of ten years CB regime, we obtain important lessons for a monetary union and for dollarization proposals. We discuss: 1) the capacity of such a regime to deal with real and nominal volatility, 2) fiscal problems and debt dynamics, 3) financial problems under currency substitution, 4) CB regime compared with dollarization and 5) the feasibility of a single–peg CB in a flexible exchange rate world.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
7843.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
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