Learning to play by the disclosure rules: accuracy of insider reports in Canada, 1996-2010
AbstractInsiders of Canadian reporting issuers are required to file public reports when they acquire, buy, or sell securities of that reporting issuer. These public reports must be filed using a prescribed form and must be filed within a specific time frame. Failure to file these public reports or filing with inaccurate information constitutes an offence under securities law. The two main objectives served by these reporting rules are: (1) primarily as a regulatory tool to detect or prevent the improper use of undisclosed information by insiders; and (2) to increase market efficiency by providing investors with information concerning the trading activities of an issuer. These objectives are dependent on compliance with the rules, yet no information regarding compliance exists. To investigate compliance a secondary source of information to verify the information provided in public reports must exist. In Canada, the CEO and the top four highest paid executives must report detailed information regarding their compensation, including stock option awards, in the annual report to shareholders. We collect information on stock option grants for these individuals for a sample of Canadian public companies for the period 2003-2011 and compare this information to that provided in the public reports. We find that while the majority of executives properly and accurately file public reports, a significant minority fail to file or file inaccurate information. We consider the consequences of this finding and suggest ways to improve the quality of insider reporting in Canada.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39793.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Securities Regulation; Compliance; Insider Disclosure; Continuous Disclosure; Employee Stock Options; Insider Trading;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
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- Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
- Compton, Ryan & Sandler, Daniel & Tedds, Lindsay M., 2010. "Backdating, tax evasion, and the unintended consequences of Canadian tax reform," MPRA Paper 39788, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Compton, Ryan & Sandler, Daniel & NIcholls, Christopher & Tedds, Lindsay M., 2011. "Insider reporting obligations and options backdating," MPRA Paper 39791, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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