Towards an understanding of the endogenous nature of group identification in games
AbstractIt is commonly assumed that identification with a social group is constant throughout the play of a one-shot game in the absence of feedback. We provide evidence which challenges this assumption. We direct subjects to play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma game. These versions are distinguished by the relative attractiveness of the uncooperative action. We refer to the version with a relatively attractive uncooperative action as the Easy Game and the other as the Difficult Game. We find that for the subjects who play the Difficult Game, their change in group identification is significantly related to their action selected. No such relationship exists within the Easy Game. Additionally, we find that the change primarily occurs after the action is selected rather than upon inspection of the game. We discuss the implications of our findings to settings both inside and outside of the laboratory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37356.
Date of creation: 14 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Group Identification; Experimental Game Theory; Endogenous Preferences; Social Identity; Decision Difficulty;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-03-21 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-03-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-03-21 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-03-21 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ahmed, Ali M., 2007. "Group identity, social distance and intergroup bias," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 324-337, June.
- Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
- Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Miller Moya, Luis Miguel & Brañas Garza, Pablo & Aguiar, Fernando, 2008.
"Personal identity. A theoretical and experimental analysis,"
DFAEII Working Papers
2009-.04, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Fernando Aguiar & Pablo Branas-Garza & Maria Paz Espinosa & Luis Miller, 2010. "Personal identity: a theoretical and experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 261-275.
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