Cyclical and constant strategies in renewable resources extraction
AbstractThis paper is concerned with the classic topic of intertemporal resource economics: the optimal harvesting of renewable natural resources over time by one and several resource owners with conflicting interests. The traditional management model, dating back to Plourde (1970), is extended towards a two–state model in which harvesting equipment is treated as a stock variable. As a consequence of this extension, an equilibrium dynamics with bifurcations and limit cycles occur. Next we discuss conflicts as a game with two types of players involved: the traditional fishermen armed with the basic equipment and the heavy equipment users. Both players have a common depletion function, thought as harvesting, which is dependent both on personal effort and on intensity of equipment’s usage.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 34654.
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Renewable resources; exploitation of natural resources; differential games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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