Analysis of employment protection legislation: a model with endogenous labour productivity
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of the different Employment Protection Legislation on the workers choices on effort. The different EPL are modelled through an easy theoretical pattern, characterized by endogenous labour productivity. In particular, it is analyzed how the labour productivity is influenced by the incentives that the different EPL give workers. The model outcomes highlight that the recent reforms produce only a positive temporary effect on the unemployment level, as emphasized by the empirical evidence. Finally, this paper analyzes a new contractual regime in order to see if it could offer in theory a better solution in term of structural employment respect to known standard regimes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27191.
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Employment Protection Legislation; Effort; Contractual Benchmark.;
Other versions of this item:
- Domenico Lisi, 2012. "Analysys Of Employment Protection Legislation: A Model With Endogenous Labour Productivity," Journal of Academic Research in Economics, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Accounting and Financial Management Constanta, vol. 4(2 (July)), pages 209-245.
- L59 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Other
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
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