This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Dividend Signaling and Unions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Arturo, Ramirez Verdugo

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Dividend signaling models suggest that dividends are used to convey information about future earnings to investors. However, in a world where unions also receive these signals, managers are less inclined to send the signal in order to avoid the union capturing these future earnings through higher salaries. Using information from IRS 5500 Forms to measure firm level unionization, I found that the power of dividends as predictors of future earnings tends to be higher for non-unionized firms. Moreover, I use the variation at the state level in the adoption of right-to-work laws to overcome the possible endogeneity of unionization with an instrumental variables approach. The empirical results are robust to different specifications and time periods

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2273/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2273.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 02 Feb 2004
Date of revision: 04 Oct 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2273

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Dividends Signaling Unions

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. " Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-51, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Watts, Ross, 1973. "The Information Content of Dividends," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 191-211, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, 2002. "Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1649-1684, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Joshua D. Rauh, 2006. "Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 33-71, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Robert Gertner & Robert Gibbons & David Scharfstein, 1988. "Simultaneous Signalling to the Capital and Product Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 173-190, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Sudipto Bhattacharya, 1979. "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 259-270, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Henry S. Farber, 1984. "Right-to-Work Laws and the Extent of Unionization," NBER Working Papers 1136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely & Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, 2005. "Dividend Changes Do Not Signal Changes in Future Profitability," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1659-1682, September. [Downloadable!]
  12. Brian E. Becker, 1995. "Union rents as a source of takeover gains among target shareholders," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 49(1), pages 3-19, October.
  13. Sarig, Oded H, 1998. "The Effect of Leverage on Bargaining with a Corporation," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 33(1), pages 1-16, February.
  14. B. Douglas Berhheim, 1991. "Tax Policy and the Dividend Puzzle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 455-476, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G., 1988. "Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 149-175, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely & Bhaskaran Swaminathan, 2002. "Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity?," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75(3), pages 387-424, July. [Downloadable!]
  17. Doron Nissim, 2001. "Dividend Changes and Future Profitability," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(6), pages 2111-2133, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Farber, Henry S, 1984. "Right-to-Work Laws and the Extent of Unionization," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(3), pages 319-52, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Franklin Allen & Roni Michaely, 2002. "Payout Policy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-21, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Allen, Franklin & Michaely, Roni, 2003. "Payout policy," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 337-429 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-17.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.