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Abstract

Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22071.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22071

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Related research

Keywords: coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
• P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
• P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General

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1. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
2. Polterovich, Victor, 2000. "Civic Culture and Economic Transition in Russia," MPRA Paper 20068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
3. Drazen, A. & Grilli, V., 1991. "The Benefits of Crisis for Economic Reforms," Papers 27-91, Tel Aviv.
   
   • Drazen, Allan & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 598-607, June.
   • Allan Drazen & Vittorio Grilli, 1990. "The Benefits of Crises for Economic Reforms," NBER Working Papers 3527, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
4. Tirole, Jean, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January.
   
   • Tirole, Jean, 1994. ""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," IDEI Working Papers 38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   • Tirole, J., 1993. "A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," Working papers 93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
5. Uribe, Martin, 1997. "Hysteresis in a simple model of currency substitution," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 185-202, September.
   
   • Martin Uribe, 1995. "Hysteresis in a simple model of currency substitution," International Finance Discussion Papers 509, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
6. Polterovich, Victor, 2007. "Institutional Trap," MPRA Paper 20595, University Library of Munich, Germany.
7. Polterovich, Victor, 2001. "Rent Seeking, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 20058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
8. A. Chong & C. Calderón, 2000. "Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-81, 03.

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