Институциональные Ловушки: Есть Ли Выход?
[Institutional Traps: Is There a Way Out?]
AbstractAny legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22071.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
- P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
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