Is It Time to Get Radical? A Game Theoritic analysis of Asian Crisis and Capital Control
AbstractPolicymakers in modern and open economies face a macroeconomic trilemma (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2005). There are three main sought-after objectives: 1. to stabilize the exchange rate; 2. to enjoy free international capital mobility 3. to engage in a monetary policy oriented toward domestic goals. Three main questions that we try to answer are : How the crisis exacerbated by international investor racing to pull out their capital from affected coutnries? Can capital control reduce it? Can capital control reduce contagion effect and regional financial instability? Using game theoritical framework and insight from behavioral economics, we analyzed herd behaviour of international investors in the time of financial crisis. Under free international capital mobility, uncertainty and lack of coordination among investors with short-horizon, we found prisoner dilemma type of arrangement that exacerbated financial crisis. Applying the anylisis to multi-stage game with government, we found that a credible threat of capital control could reduce herd behaviour and escape the worst of financial crisis. Therefore, fredom to employ capital control is a policy tool that enable escape from the trilemma and pursue all three goals at the same time. We modify the framework to include multiple countries under financial crisis and fear of contagion. We found the ability to impose capital control, under certain conditions, will isolate the crisis and reduce contagion effect. We also explore the critical value when capital control should be enacted with regard to domestic economic condition, on which government political mandate base upon, and differences of reactions in relation to political regime. We conclude by citing incidences of insistance toward comitment against capital control by IMF in loans approcal and US in free trade agreement as misdirected, unncessesary and even harmful in some cases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2073.
Date of creation: 24 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Asiena crisis; game theory; capital control;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-03-31 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IFN-2007-03-31 (International Finance)
- NEP-SEA-2007-03-31 (South East Asia)
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