We model bank oligopoly behaviour using price and non-price competition as strategic variables in an expanded conjectural variations framework. Rivals can respond to changes in both loan and deposit market prices as well as (non-price) branch market shares. The model is illustrated using data for Spain which, over 1986-2002, eliminated interest rate and branching restrictions and set off a competitive race to lock-in expanded market shares. Banks use both interest rates and branches as strategic variables and both have changed over time. We illustrate the results using a regional vs. a national specification for the relevant markets.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
17612.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Francisco Pérez García & Joaquín Maudos Villarroya & Juan Francisco Fernández de Guevara Radoselovics, 2002.
"Market Power In European Banking Sectors,"
Working Papers. Serie EC
2002-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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