Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative
AbstractWe propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general finite-period games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games that allow a continuum of types and strategies. The CSE is always a Nash equilibrium and is equivalent to the SE in finite games. So, the CSE is a complete solution concept in the general games as a version of the SE. The WCSE is a weak, but simple version of the CSE. It is also a complete solution concept and functions as an alternative solution concept to the CSE. Their relation with converted versions of the perfect equilibrium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium are discussed
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15443.
Date of creation: 26 May 2009
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Complete Belief; Complete Sequential Equilibirum; Finite-period game; Solution Concept; Sequential Convergency; Sequential Equilibrium.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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