Perfect Regular Equilibrium
AbstractWe propose a revised version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-period games with observed actions. In finite games, perfect Bayesian equilibria are weakly consistent and subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In general games that allow a continuum of types and strategies, however, perfect Bayesian equilibria might not satisfy these criteria of rational solution concepts. To solve this problem, we revise the definition of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium by replacing Bayes' rule with a regular conditional probability. We call this revised solution concept a perfect regular equilibrium. Perfect regular equilibria are always weakly consistent and subgame perfect Nash equilibria in general games. In addition, perfect regular equilibria are equivalent to simplified perfect Bayesian equilibria in finite games. Therefore, the perfect regular equilibrium is an extended and simple version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-period games with observed actions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26534.
Date of creation: 09 Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Bayes' rule; general Multi-period game; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Perfect regular equilibrium; Regular conditional probability; Solution concept.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
237, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
- Kreps, David M & Ramey, Garey, 1987. "Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1331-48, November.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009. "Strategic Information Transmission: Comment," MPRA Paper 17115, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009. "Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative," MPRA Paper 15443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.