Enjeux stratégiques du concours des Maîtres de Conférences
AbstractContrary to most countries, the recruitment of assistant professors in France is centralized: recruitment committees submit a ranking of candidates to the Ministry of Education, the candidates submit their own ranking over the faculties that rank them and the Ministry compute the final match accordingly to these lists. The strategic stakes of this procedure are not well known in France. We show that the procedure satisfies desirable properties of stability and optimality. In order to do so, we identify the matching rule used by the Ministry using the information available to the candidates. The structure of the algorithm that produce the final matching is also analyzed. Finally, we discuss the existence of quotas on Departments rankings, the new features of the next campaign of recruitment and their relationships with job mobility.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13002.
Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision:
French academic job market; matching model; stability; strategic behavior;
Other versions of this item:
- Iehlé, Vincent & Haeringer, Guillaume, 2010. "Enjeux stratégiques du concours des Maîtres de Conférences," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/85, Paris Dauphine University.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2009-01-31 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2009-01-31 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2009-01-31 (Sociology of Economics)
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