Concesiones de plazo variable para la construcción y explotación de autopistas
[Variable-term concessions for road construction and operation]
AbstractPrivate sector participation in infrastructure projects traditionally financed by governments (roads, airports, seaports) is increasing around the world. This paper describes how a toll road concession works. It discusses how the usual mechanism, based on a concession contract with a pre-determined fixed term, and a selection process of concessionaires through minimum-toll auctions, does not lead to optimal outcomes. In particular, it is shown how this type of mechanism in fact lies behind the frequent concession contract renegotiations observed in practice. A new mechanism is proposed, based on a flexible term concession, which is adjusted according to the actual traffic level using the road, and an auction with bids for total net revenue and maintenance costs. This new mechanism eliminates traffic risk from toll road concessions, and it guarantees an effective selection of the most efficient concessionaires.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 12653.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
roads; highways; franchising; concessions; auctions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
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