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Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance

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  • Arno Apffelstaedt
  • Jana Freundt

    (Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

We study experimentally how people’s willingness to comply with elected rules is affected by voter manipulation and disenfranchisement. Groups of 100 subjects vote on a “code of conduct” regarding behavior in a dictator game. Introducing a voting fee, offering subjects money to change their votes, or excluding the votes of low-income subjects leads to a strong decline in voluntary compliance with elected rules that ask subjects to give. Rules that ask subjects to not give see no decline. Heterogeneity in behavioral reactions suggests that treatment effects are driven by preferences for democratic participation and by preferences for unbiased election procedures.

Suggested Citation

  • Arno Apffelstaedt & Jana Freundt, 2018. "Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance," PPE Working Papers 0018, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    • Handle: RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0018
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    Cited by:

    1. Arno Apffelstaedt & Jana Freundt & Christoph Oslislo, 2021. "Social Norms and Elections: How Elected Rules Can Make Behavior (In)Appropriate," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 068, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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