Gender Differences and Dynamics in Competition: The Role of Luck
AbstractWe present experimental evidence which sheds new light on why women may be less competitive than men.� Specifically, we observe striking differences in how men and women respond to good and bad luck in a competitive environment.� Following a loss, women tend to reduce effort, and the effect is independent of the monetary value of the prize that the women failed to win.� Men, on the other hand, reduce effort only after failing to win large prizes.� Responses to previous competitve outcomes explain about 11% of the variation that we observe in women's efforts, but only about 4% of the variation in the effort of men, and differential responses to luck account for about half of the gender performance gap in our experiment.� These findings help to explain both female underperformance in environments with repeated competition and the tendency for women to select into tournaments at a lower rate than men.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 564.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Real effort experiments; gender differences; gender gap; competition aversion; tournament; luck; win; loss; competitive outcomes;
Other versions of this item:
- Gill, David & Prowse, Victoria, 2012. "Gender differences and dynamics in competition: the role of luck," MPRA Paper 38220, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David Gill & Victoria Prowse, 2013. "Gender Differences and Dynamics in Competition: The Role of Luck," Discussion Papers 2013001, University of Oxford, Nuffield College.
- Gill, David & Prowse, Victoria, 2010. "Gender Differences and Dynamics in Competition: The Role of Luck," IZA Discussion Papers 5022, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-09-05 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-09-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2011-09-05 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cason, Timothy & Masters, William & Sheremeta, Roman, 2010.
"Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study,"
49886, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2010. "Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 604-611, October.
- Timothy N. Cason & William A. Masters & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Entry Into Winner-Take-All And Proportional-Prize Contests:An Experimental Study," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1231, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Timothy N. Cason & William A. Masters & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 10-10, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J., 2010.
"Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4941, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
- Gary Charness & Peter J. Kuhn, 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," NBER Working Papers 15913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.