Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Paul Collier
  • Anke Hoeffler
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Resource-rich countries have tended to be autocratic and also have tended to use their resource wealth badly. The neoconservative agenda of promoting democratization in resource-rich countries thus offers the hopeful prospect of a better use of their economic opportunities. This paper examines whether the effect of democracy on economic performance is distinctive in resource-rich societies. We show that a priori the sign of the effect is ambiguous: resource rents could either enhance or undermine the economic consequences of democracy. We therefore investigate the issue empirically. We first build a new data set on country-specific resource rents, annually for the period 1970-2001. Using a global panel data set we find that in developing countries the combination of high natural resource rents and open democratic systems has been growth-reducing. Checks and balances offset this adverse effect. Thus, resource-rich economies need a distinctive form of democracy with particularly strong checks and balances. Unfortunately this is rare: checks and balances are public goods and so are liable to be undersupplied in new democracies. Over time they are eroded by resource rents.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/images/stories/papers/ResearchPapers/oxcarrerp200813.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford in its series OxCarre Working Papers with number 013.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:oxf:oxcrwp:013

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Political economy; natural resources; growth.;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," Development and Comp Systems 0210003, EconWPA.
    2. Paul Collier & Benedikt Goderis, 2007. "Prospects for Commodity Exporters," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 8(2), pages 1-15, April.
    3. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2006. "Political foundations of the resource curse," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 447-468, April.
    4. Måns Söderbom & Francis Teal & Anthony Wambugu & Godius Kahyarara, 2003. "The Dynamics of Returns to Education in Kenyan and Tanzanian Manufacturing," CSAE Working Paper Series 2003-17, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    5. Wacziarg, Romain & Alesina, Alberto & Devleeschauwer, Arnaud & Easterly, William & Kurlat, Sergio, 2002. "Fractionalization," Research Papers 1744, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    6. Collier, Paul & Goderis, Benedikt, 2008. "Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum," MPRA Paper 17315, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:oxcrwp:013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Celia Kingham).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.