Markov Perfect Political Equilibria with Public Policy: The Role of Education Cost
AbstractThis paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of public policy via individual decision-making. The paper extends the model in Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2007, Journal of Economic Theory; henceforth HSZ) by generalizing the cost function of education and considers several cases, along with HSZ as a special case. In cases where education cost is high, the characterization of political equilibrium is similar to HSZ. In cases where education cost is low, the characterization is entirely different from HSZ: namely, a political equilibrium exists where (i) the rich are always politically decisive and (ii) the equilibrium outcome is unique.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 07-31.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Markov perfect equilibrium; Dynamic political economy; Public policy; Education cost;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2007-08-27 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-EDU-2007-08-27 (Education)
- NEP-MAC-2007-08-27 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2007-08-27 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hassler, John & Mora, José V Rodríguez & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2001.
"The Survival of the Welfare State,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2905, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2001. "The survival of the welfare state," Economics Working Papers 603, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Hassler, John & Mora, Jose & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2002. "The Survival of the Welfare State," Seminar Papers 704, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Hassler, John & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2003.
"Democratic Public Good Provision,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4044, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hassler, John & Krusell, Per & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2005. "The dynamics of government," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1331-1358, October.
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