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Towards Putting a Price on the Risk of Bank Failure

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  • Daniel Snethlage

    (The Treasury)

Abstract

This paper develops a new approach for conceptualizing and measuring the risk associated with bank failure. The price of this risk in risk-adjusted present-value terms is estimated at $170-340 million per annum (0.07-0.15% of GDP), representing the price of the financial risk that exists ex-ante (ie, before a bank fails). This can be interpreted as the cost that is either passed onto the banks via higher funding costs, or borne as an implicit risk on the government’s balance sheet. Alternatively, one could think of this as a one-off cost, in the event that all major banks failed in a single crisis. If that were to happen, and if net losses were to be 5-10 per cent of bank liabilities the total cost could be $16-31 billion (7-13% of GDP). This can be interpreted as either the net cost of a government bail-out, or the total value of haircuts on wholesale and retail creditors that would be applied under an Open Bank Resolution (OBR) or a liquidation. Bank bail-outs are not necessarily required or recommended in New Zealand given the existence of OBR. However, the major banks currently receive a one-notch uplift in their credit ratings specifically because of the expectation of government support. These ratings' uplifts are used to estimate the market-implied likelihood that the banks would be bailed out in the event of their failure, and therefore the size of the implicit guarantee banks that are seen to receive. This perceived implicit guarantee is estimated to be worth around $80-$230million per annum (0.04%-0.11% of GDP), equivalent to a 3-8 basis points subsidy on banks' total borrowing costs. This estimate is low by international standards, consistent with the current soundness of the major domestic banks and the relatively low perceived likelihood of government support.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Snethlage, 2015. "Towards Putting a Price on the Risk of Bank Failure," Treasury Working Paper Series 15/03, New Zealand Treasury.
  • Handle: RePEc:nzt:nztwps:15/03
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    File URL: https://treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2015-03/twp15-03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "The Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 466-472, May.
    2. Francis A. Longstaff & Sanjay Mithal & Eric Neis, 2005. "Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(5), pages 2213-2253, October.
    3. Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, 2020. "Systemic Banking Crises Database II," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 68(2), pages 307-361, June.
    4. Sebastian Schich & Sofia Lindh, 2012. "Implicit guarantees for bank debt: where do we stand?," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2012(1), pages 45-63.
    5. Polackova, Hana, 1998. "Contingent government liabilities : a hidden risk for fiscal stability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1989, The World Bank.
    6. Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt & Edward J. Kane & Luc Laeven (ed.), 2008. "Deposit Insurance around the World: Issues of Design and Implementation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262042541, December.
    7. Ueda, Kenichi & Weder di Mauro, B., 2013. "Quantifying structural subsidy values for systemically important financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 3830-3842.
    8. Noss, Joseph & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon, 2012. "Financial Stability Paper No 15: The implicit subsidy of banks," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 15, Bank of England.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rösch, Daniel & Scheule, Harald, 2016. "The role of loan portfolio losses and bank capital for Asian financial system resilience," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 289-305.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank failure; contingent liabilities; implicit guarantee; financial crises; bail-out; bail-in; bank resolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other

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