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Quantifying and Explaining Implicit Public Guarantees for European Banks

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  • Oana TOADER

Abstract

This study provides estimation of public implicit guarantees over the period 1997 to 2012 using a rating-based model. The analysis focuses on a sample of 56 large listed European banks. It appears that the main element for determining the value of the public subsidy is the intrinsic strength of the bank. In addition, we bring evidence on the importance of the guarantor strength on the value of the implicit guarantee: a higher sovereign rating of a bank's home country leads to larger implicit subsidies for banks' debt. Our findings also suggest that the recently observed decrease in the value of implicit subsidies goes beyond the declining in European sovereigns' strength. Rather, it is consistent with the implementation of resolution regimes and practices moving from a “bailout” resolution policy to “bail-in” recapitalization. Resolution schemes providing more explicit rules to treat banks' bankruptcies will reduce investors' expectations of public support.
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  • Oana TOADER, 2013. "Quantifying and Explaining Implicit Public Guarantees for European Banks," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 1378, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    • Handle: RePEc:leo:wpaper:1378
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Covi & Ulrich Eydam, 2020. "End of the sovereign-bank doom loop in the European Union? The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 5-30, January.
    2. Yu-Li Huang & Chung-Hua Shen & Kun-Li Lin, 2022. "Did the rating standard for banks change after the crisis?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 1617-1663, May.
    3. Marta Gómez-Puig & Simón Sosvilla-Rivero & Manish K. Singh, 2015. "“Sovereigns and banks in the euro area: a tale of two crises”," IREA Working Papers 201504, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jan 2015.
    4. Leanza, Luca & Sbuelz, Alessandro & Tarelli, Andrea, 2021. "Bail-in vs bail-out: Bank resolution and liability structure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    5. Pérez-Rodríguez, Jorge V. & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón & Andrada-Felix, Julián & Gómez-Déniz, Emilio, 2022. "Searching for informed traders in stock markets: The case of Banco Popular," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banks; implicit subsidy; rating; bail-in; bail-out; banking union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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