Pradeep Dubey () (Center for Game Theory, Dept. of Economics, SUNY at Stony Brook and Cowles Foundation, Yale University) Dieter Sondermann (Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Bonn.)
Abstract
We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
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