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Infinite Horizon Games With Perfect Equilibrium Points

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  • Subir K Chakrabarti

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  • Subir K Chakrabarti, 1987. "Infinite Horizon Games With Perfect Equilibrium Points," Discussion Papers 742, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:742
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    1. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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