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A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence

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Author Info
Franz Dietrich (Group on Philosophy, Probability and Modelling, University of Konstanz, Germany)
Christian List () (Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK)

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Abstract

In the classical Condorcet jury model, different jurors' votes are independent random variables, where each juror has the same probability p>1/2 of voting for the correct alternative. The probability that the correct alternative will win under majority voting converges to 1 as the number of jurors increases. Hence the probability of an incorrect majority vote can be made arbitrarily small, a result that may seem unrealistic. A more realistic model is obtained by relaxing the assumption of independence and relating the vote of every juror to the same "body of evidence". In terms of Bayesian trees, the votes are direct descendants not of the true state of the world ('guilty' or 'not guilty'), but of the "body of evidence", which in turn is a direct descendant of the true state of the world. This permits the possibility of a misleading body of evidence. Our main theorem shows that the probability that the correct alternative will win under majority voting converges to the probability that the body of evidence is not misleading, which may be strictly less than 1.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2002-W23.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 24 Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0223

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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

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Related research
Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem conditional independence interpretation of evidence Bayesian trees

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush, 1998. "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 481-488. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christian List, 2002. "On the Significance of the Absolute Margin," Public Economics 0211004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dietrich Franz, 2008. "The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified," Research Memoranda 012, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  3. Daniel Berend & Luba Sapir, 2007. "Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 507-528, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Franz Dietrich, 2006. "General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 263-283, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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