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Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game

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Author Info
Robert Hoffmann () (Nottingham University Business School)

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Abstract

This paper explores a model of bounded rationality in evolutionary game play in which agent choice is based on a social psychological process of categorization and social inference. The computer simulation of the model demonstrates that agents' increasing ability to categorize opponents in the chicken game affords a higher population average payoff and introduces increasing social stratification among them. Greater trait diversity and population size are shown to have a harmful effect on payoffs.

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File URL: ftp://all.repec.org/RePEc/nom/occasi/chicken.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Nottingham University Business School in its series Occasional Papers with number 1.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: 10 Oct 2001
Date of revision: 10 Apr 2001
Handle: RePEc:nom:occasi:1

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Related research
Keywords: bounded rationality; social cognition; chicken game; stereotypes; categorization; adaptive expectations; social inference; discrimination; social stratification;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "The Ecology of Cooperation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 101-118, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000. "Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-262, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Robert Axtell, Joshua M. Epstein, & H. Peyton Young, . "The Emergence of Economic Classes in an Agent-based Bargaining Model," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997 61, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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