Quota Licenses for Imported Capital Equipment: Could Bureaucrats Ever DoBetter than the Market?
AbstractDespite valid criticisms, many developing countries have issued non-transferable import licenses to a limited number of final-good producers so as to restrict imports of an input capital equipment. This paper demonstrates that for a given import quota, such licensing restrictions can actually increase domestic production of both the input and the final product, but at the cost of reduced quota rents. Under pure competition, domestic welfare falls relative to the use of marketable quota licenses, but if foreigners would get the quota rents, or if external economies cause decreasing costs, then bureaucratic allocation can dominate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5695.
Date of creation: Aug 1996
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Publication status: published as Journal of International Economics, Vol. 43, nos. 1 & 2 (August 1997): 1-29.
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Other versions of this item:
- Spencer, Barbara J., 1997. "Quota licenses for imported capital equipment: Could bureaucrats ever do better than the market?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 1-27, August.
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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