Tax Credits for Debt Reduction
AbstractThe incentives for domestic investment in debtor countries are influenced by the terms of their external obligations and by the system of taxation utilized to provide government revenue for debt payments. It is well known that existing debt contracts could be altered to improve the incentives for investment but this has proven difficult to accomplish, perhaps because individual creditors have incentives not to agree to such changes. In this paper we show that a simple tax credit scheme that can be implemented unilaterally by the debtor government can overcome at least some of the inefficiencies caused by existing debt contracts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3137.
Date of creation: Jun 1992
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- Froot, Kenneth A, 1989.
"Buybacks, Exit Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt and Liquidity Relief,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(1), pages 49-70, February.
- Kenneth A. Froot, 1989. "Buybacks, Exit Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt and Liquidity Relief," NBER Working Papers 2675, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dooley, Michael P, 1989. "Debt Relief and Leveraged Buy-Outs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(1), pages 71-75, February.
- Amnon Levy, 1997. "Sovereign debt: Reputation, seizure and reputation," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 69-79, March.
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