IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/27665.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Valuing Long-Term Property Rights with Anticipated Political Regime Shifts

Author

Listed:
  • Zhiguo He
  • Maggie Rong Hu
  • Zhenping Wang
  • Vincent Yao

Abstract

We identify exposure to political risk by exploiting a unique variation around land lease extension protection after 2047 in Hong Kong's housing market due to historical arrangements under the “One Country, Two Systems” design. Relative to properties that have been promised an extension protection, those with legally unprotected leases granted by the current government are sold at a substantial discount of around 8%, and those with colonial leases suffer an additional discount of about 8%. Incorporating estimated structural parameters that suggest an additional 20% ground rent after 2047, our model matches these empirical discounts well across long-term lease horizons. We find that the discount increases as time approaches 2047 and is higher in areas where residents feel more pessimistic about the city's future.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhiguo He & Maggie Rong Hu & Zhenping Wang & Vincent Yao, 2020. "Valuing Long-Term Property Rights with Anticipated Political Regime Shifts," NBER Working Papers 27665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27665
    Note: AP CF DEV LE POL
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w27665.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Hansen, Lars Peter, 2013. "Uncertainty Outside and Inside Economic Models," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2013-7, Nobel Prize Committee.
    3. Hainmueller, Jens, 2012. "Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate Reweighting Method to Produce Balanced Samples in Observational Studies," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 25-46, January.
    4. Jules van Binsbergen & Michael Brandt & Ralph Koijen, 2012. "On the Timing and Pricing of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1596-1618, June.
    5. Pástor, Ľuboš & Veronesi, Pietro, 2013. "Political uncertainty and risk premia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 520-545.
    6. Robert J. Barro, 2015. "Environmental Protection, Rare Disasters and Discount Rates," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82(325), pages 1-23, January.
    7. Lubos Pástor & Pietro Veronesi, 2012. "Uncertainty about Government Policy and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(4), pages 1219-1264, August.
    8. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    9. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(2), pages 389-430.
    10. Robert S. Pindyck, 2013. "Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(3), pages 860-872, September.
    11. Case, Karl E & Shiller, Robert J, 1989. "The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 125-137, March.
    12. Tarek A Hassan & Stephan Hollander & Laurence van Lent & Ahmed Tahoun, 2019. "Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(4), pages 2135-2202.
    13. Rosen, Sherwin, 1974. "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 34-55, Jan.-Feb..
    14. Galiani, Sebastian & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2010. "Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 700-729, October.
    15. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    16. Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, 2008. "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 981-1022, December.
    17. Bryan Kelly & Ľuboš Pástor & Pietro Veronesi, 2016. "The Price of Political Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence from the Option Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(5), pages 2417-2480, October.
    18. Erica Field, 2007. "Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1561-1602.
    19. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
    20. Abdulai, Awudu & Owusu, Victor & Goetz, Renan, 2011. "Land tenure differences and investment in land improvement measures: Theoretical and empirical analyses," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 66-78, September.
    21. Lars Peter Hansen, 2014. "Nobel Lecture: Uncertainty Outside and Inside Economic Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(5), pages 945-987.
    22. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhiguo He & Maggie Hu & Zhenping Wang & Vincent Yao, 2020. "Valuation of Long-Term Property Rights under Political Uncertainty," Working Papers 2020-105, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    2. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010. "Property Rights and Economic Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595, Elsevier.
    3. Aragón, Fernando M., 2015. "Do better property rights improve local income?: Evidence from First Nations' treaties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 43-56.
    4. Ayalew, Hailemariam & Admasu, Yeshwas & Chamberlin, Jordan, 2021. "Is land certification pro-poor? Evidence from Ethiopia," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    5. Dane M. Christensen & Arthur Morris & Beverly R. Walther & Laura A. Wellman, 2023. "Political information flow and management guidance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 1466-1499, September.
    6. Katja Kalkschmied, 2020. "Rebundling Institutions," Graz Economics Papers 2020-03, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    7. Xu, Huayu, 2021. "The long-term health and economic consequences of improved property rights," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    8. Congdon Fors, Heather & Houngbedji, Kenneth & Lindskog, Annika, 2019. "Land certification and schooling in rural Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 190-208.
    9. A. Patrick Behrer & Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Andrei Shleifer, 2021. "Securing Property Rights," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(4), pages 1157-1192.
    10. Gao, Xuwen & Shi, Xinjie & Fang, Shile, 2021. "Property rights and misallocation: Evidence from land certification in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    11. Meeks, Robyn, 2018. "Property Rights and Water Access: Evidence from Land Titling in Rural Peru," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 345-357.
    12. Muñoz-Mora, Juan Carlos & Tobón, Santiago & d’Anjou, Jesse Willem, 2018. "The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops: Evidence from Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 268-283.
    13. Huntington, Heather & Shenoy, Ajay, 2021. "Does insecure land tenure deter investment? Evidence from a randomized controlled trial," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    14. Fan, Gang-Zhi & Li, Han & Li, Jiangyi & Zhang, Jian, 2022. "Housing property rights, collateral, and entrepreneurship: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    15. Perry Ferrell, 2019. "Titles for me but not for thee: transitional gains trap of property rights extension in Colombia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 95-114, January.
    16. Olayinka Oyekola & Meryem Duygun & Samuel Odewunmi & Temitope Fagbemi, 2023. "Political risk and external finance: Evidence from cross-country firm-level data," Discussion Papers 2312, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    17. Fernando M. Aragon, 2014. "Do better property rights improve local income?: Evidence from First Nations' treaties," Discussion Papers dp14-02, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    18. Thiemo Fetzer & Samuel Marden, 2017. "Take What You Can: Property Rights, Contestability and Conflict," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 0(601), pages 757-783, May.
    19. Fenske, James, 2014. "Trees, tenure and conflict: Rubber in colonial Benin," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 226-238.
    20. Ramírez-Álvarez, Aurora Alejandra, 2019. "Land titling and its effect on the allocation of public goods: Evidence from Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 1-1.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K25 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Real Estate Law
    • N25 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Asia including Middle East
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27665. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.