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Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework

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  • Jonathan Heathcote
  • Kjetil Storesletten
  • Giovanni L. Violante

Abstract

What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. At the same time, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, and aggravates the externality associated with valued public expenditures. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all of these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preferences, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the externality linked to valued government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting desired progressivity.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19899.

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Date of creation: Feb 2014
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19899

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  1. Optimal Tax Progressivity: An Analytical Framework
    by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2014-02-28 17:27:21

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