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Managing Licensing in a Market for Technology

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  • Ashish Arora
  • Andrea Fosfuri
  • Thomas Roende

Abstract

Over the last decade, companies have paid greater attention to the management of their intellectual assets. We build a model that helps understand how licensing activity should be organized within large corporations. More specifically, we compare decentralization—where the business unit using the technology makes licensing decisions—to centralized licensing. The business unit has superior information about licensing opportunities but may not have the appropriate incentives because its rewards depend upon product market performance. If licensing is decentralized, the business unit forgoes valuable licensing opportunities since the rewards for licensing are (optimally) weaker than those for product market profits. This distortion is stronger when production-based incentives are more powerful, making centralization more attractive. Growth of technology markets favors centralization and drives higher licensing rates. Our model conforms to the existing evidence that reports heterogeneity across firms in both licensing propensity and organization of licensing.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18203.

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Date of creation: Jul 2012
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18203

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  1. Ashish Arora & Sharon Belenzon & Luis A. Rios, 2011. "The Organization of R&D in American Corporations: The Determinants and Consequences of Decentralization," NBER Working Papers 17013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  12. Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
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