Organization of Disaster Aid Delivery: Spending Your Donations
AbstractThis paper analyzes how different organizational structures between funding and implementing agencies affect the quality of aid delivered and social agendas pursued across neighboring villages in a set disaster context. We model the implied objective functions and trade-offs concerning aid quality, aid quantity, and social agendas of different types of agencies. We analyze three waves of survey data on fishermen and fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia from 2005-2009, following the tsunami. Different organizational structures result in significantly different qualities of hard aid, differential willingness to share aid delivery with other NGOs in a village, and differential promotion of public good objectives and maintenance of village religious and occupational traditions. This is the first time these aspects have been modeled and quantified in the literature. Some well known international NGOs delivered housing with relatively low rates of reported faults such as leaky roofs and cracked walls; others had relatively high rates. For boats, some had very high rates of boat “failure”, boats that sank upon launch, were not seaworthy, or fell apart within a month or two. We also document how a social agenda of particular agencies to promote greater equality can be thwarted and distorted by village leaders, potentially increasing inequality.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17707.
Date of creation: Dec 2011
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- H84 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Disaster Aid
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2012-01-10 (Development)
- NEP-SEA-2012-01-10 (South East Asia)
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