Aide Au Développement Et Information Asymétrique : Une Analyse Principal-Agent
AbstractIn recent years some critiques toward the efficiency of foreign aid have appeared in the economic literature. The allocation of foreign aid toward corrupt governments induces the failure of development policies. Donors have to control the use of aid in order to avoid the risk of kleptocracy. Our work is based on the role of the principal-agent model as a tool to analyze the allocating of foreign aid. We use the principal-agent model to formalize the problem of aid efficiency. We find that foreign aid allocation without any coordination between donors induces inefficiency in the setting out of development policies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var in its journal Région et Développement.
Volume (Year): 34 (2011)
Issue (Month): ()
INFORMATION ASYMÉTRIQUE; DÉVELOPPEMENT; AIDE; PRINCIPAL-AGENT;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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ULB Institutional Repository
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