Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation
AbstractWe study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the paper has a number of potential applications in financial economics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17368.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-09-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2011-09-05 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
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