Is a VC Partnership Greater than the Sum of its Partners?
AbstractThis paper investigates whether individual venture capitalists have repeatable investment skill and to what extent their skill is impacted by the VC firm where they work. We examine a unique dataset that tracks the performance of individual venture capitalists’ investments across time and as they move between firms. We find evidence of skill and exit style differences even among venture partners investing at the same VC firm at the same time. Furthermore, our estimates suggest the partner’s human capital is two to five times more important than the VC firm’s organizational capital in explaining performance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19120.
Date of creation: Jun 2013
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
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