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Taxes, Permits, and Climate Change

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  • Louis Kaplow

Abstract

This essay revisits the question of instrument choice for the regulation of externalities in the context of climate change. The central point is that the Pigouvian prescription to equate marginal control costs with the expected marginal benefits of damage reduction should guide the design of both carbon taxes and permit schemes. Because expected marginal damage rises nonlinearly, a corresponding nonlinear tax - or an equivalent price implemented through a quantity-adjusted permit scheme - is second best. Also considered are political factors, distinctive features of regulating a stock pollutant, and ex ante distortions due to the anticipation of transition relief (such as by receiving more free permits for greater emissions). Finally, distributive concerns are examined, with emphasis on the conceptual and practical benefits of addressing distributive issues with the tax and transfer system rather through adjustments to regulatory schemes that usually render them less effective.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Kaplow, 2010. "Taxes, Permits, and Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 16268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16268
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert N. Stavins, 2011. "The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100 Years," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 81-108, February.
    2. Lu & Pollitt, M. G. & Wang, K. & Wei, Y-M., 2023. "The Incremental Impact of China's Carbon," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2349, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Oladi, Reza & Caplan, Arthur J. & Gilbert, John, 2018. "Sequestration and the engagement of developing economies in a global carbon market," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 50-63.
    4. Tang, Bao-Jun & Wang, Xiang-Yu & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2019. "Quantities versus prices for best social welfare in carbon reduction: A literature review," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 233, pages 554-564.
    5. Mei Lu & Michael G. Pollitt & Ke Wang & Yi-Ming Wei, 2023. "The incremental impact of China’s carbon trading pilots," Working Papers EPRG2316, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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