Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

Contents:

Author Info

  • A. Mitchell Polinsky
  • Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Abstract

This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between cash and coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount -- a "coupon-cash remedy" -- is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w11227.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11227.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11227

Note: LE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1996. "Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages," NBER Working Papers 4287, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2004. "Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts," Microeconomics 0401001, EconWPA.
  3. Severin Borenstein, 1995. "Settling for Coupons: Discount Contracts as Compensation and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits," NBER Working Papers 5085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2003. "Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt92m0w4px, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  5. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2003. "Remedies For Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss Of Coupons And Discounts," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1gs1g2g2, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  6. Spier, Kathryn E, 1994. "Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 84-95, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11227

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.